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TIP: Another Weapon in
the Class War Waged
against Workers
H.J. Glasbeek *
Introduction
As an interested participant in the Workshop on
Tax-Based Incomes Policies, I would like to add a few
comments by way of contribution to the discussion. In
effect, my remarks will take up the train of thought set
in motion by the presentation made by Stephen Jelly.
Jelly pointed out that:
Controls are simply one, albeit highly visible, aspect of a
general economic and legislative assault on workers and the
bargaining process. Government and the corporate sector
are fully cognizant of this fact, and exploit it by employing
the spectre of controls to draw attention away from equally
or more repressive aspects of its overall, co-ordinated
policy of restraint.'
Prior to that, Jelly's presentation had gone some length
to demonstrate how: (a) government had consciously
adopted expansionary or restraining economic policies
to combat the problem of the moment, inflation some-
times, unemployment at others; (b) by 1975, the Cana-
dian government had adopted, as part of its ongoing
determination to redistribute income from labour to
capital, wages' and prices' controls because the tradi-
tional monetary and fiscal policies were not doing the
job; (c) monetarism developed to counter the infla-
tionary spiral which has manifested itself, despite in-
creasing unemployment.
Jelly goes on to argue that the brunt of inflation
dampening will fall on workers as idle capacity and
unemployment is created by severe restrictions in money
supplies. He sees this as part of the persistent effort by a
capitalistic State's government to permit capital ac-
cumulation at the expense of workers' incomes.
Naturally, he is not very interested in wage control
mechanics. He notes that tax-based incomes policies
would be just one variant of the means used by the State
to achieve its goals. To support this, he notes the other
means used by government to redistribute income from
labourers to capitalists, e.g., manipulating income taxa-
tion levels by direct or indirect methods, reducing
transfer payment systems, decreasing the scope of
benefits' schemes, directly restraining the wage demands
of the employees under its controls, weakening the
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bargaining position of private sector employees. He in-
dicates how successful these methods are proving by
pointing to the decline in labour's share of income.2
What Jelly does, then, is to place the debate about
TIP in its historical and political setting. In doing so, he
departs from the approach taken by the other par-
ticipants, with the exception of Weldon who seems to
share Jelly's viewpoint but, in the particular paper
given, largely confines himself to an evaluation of the
economic justifications for and administrative feasibili-
ty of a TIP system. I, like Jelly, believe that the most
fruitful assessment of such control mechanisms as TIP is
one which seeks to locate them in the framework of
political struggles. What follows are some comments
which complement the Jelly paper.
To disregard the political thrust behind
policy instruments such as collective
bargaining and incomes policies is to
study economics in a vacuum. Only
professional economists can afford
that. Workers cannot.
I will try to show that incomes policies are offered
by their theoretical proponents, in good faith, as in-
cidental tools in the quest for a better economic condi-
tion, but that they will, as a matter of practical politics,
very likely be aimed at restricting wage earners' oppor-
tunies to retain (let alone improve) their share of the na-
tion's wealth. I will argue that the known historic use of
incomes policies in this manner better explains the
politicians' ready acceptance of incomes policies than
* H.J. Glasbeek teaches law at Osgoode Hall Law
School.
1. Jelly, "Effect of Wage Controls on Collective Bargaining,"
Canadian Taxation (this issue).
2. Id., and Weldon, "Incomes Policies in Canada: Programmes
without Theory or Purpose," Canadian Taxation (this issue).
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does the persuasiveness of economists' arguments which
are used by politicians in public debate as justifiying
their support for incomes policies. The argument that
the repression of workers may be the most significant
rationale for a proposal such as TIP will gain further
strength if it can be shown that, politically, this is an
aim that is pursued consistently by the adoption of a
number of different policy instruments. Thus: if TIP is
to be characterized as one tool amongst many by which
to contain workers' demands, a labour lawyer like me
might contribute usefully by cataloguing the various
legal tools governments have used, over time, to negate
workers' aspirations to obtain a greater share of income.
I do not mean to list all the devices used by government
to control the distribution of income. I will merely point
to the ones directly aimed at confining workers' bargain-
ing strength. This will lead me to the speculation that
labour's frenzied efforts to resist the imposition of
... the market must be restructured
because its harmful imperfections are
not self-correcting
direct wage controls may lead it into Herculean battles
which leave it so enfeebled that it is in no condition to
take on the struggle to cut the many less visible fetters
which bind it and repress it. Indeed, labour, having
fought against AIBS, TIPs, etc., is, understandably
enough, likely to rest on its laurels if it succeeds even
partially in such fights, believing then that it will have
retained its right to free bargaining and, thus, its oppor-
tunity to attain a better economic deal. From this
perspective, even good faith economic arguments which
give politicians the opportunity to introduce any form
of incomes policy are likely to cause the perpetration of
a vicious fraud on workers.
Inflation as a Justification for
an Incomes Policy
In public debate, it is assumed that inflation is an
evil which must be eradicated and that incomes' policies
may be warranted to achieve this aim. While this may be
crystal clear to purveyors of popular economic wisdom,
others may be a little mystified by the assumption that
inflation is a source of such great concern that it
justifies an attack on market operation. Inflation has
distributional effects, in as much as it does not affect
everyone in the economy in the same way. While there
can be no question that this is unfair, particularly to
persons on fixed incomes, it does not seem, in principle,
much harsher than many other such undesirable
distributional effects associated with the operation of a
market economy. For instance, imperfections in market
structure, even if they do not fall foul of existing law
because of the legal system's pre-occupation with overt
conspiracy rather than market evolution,' will very like-
ly have an uneven distributional effect by irrationally
moving income from some consumers to some produ-
cers. Environmental pollution may shift the cost of pro-
duction, quite haphazardly, from the polluters to con-
sumers, other producers or the public at large. The same
is true of, say, discrimination on the basis of sex: if an
employer can pay female labour less than males
employed by competitors because of the non-applica-
bility of equal pay/anti-discriminatory law to his enter-
prise, unwanted distributional effects may occur.4 That
is, if distributional effects arising out of market opera-
tions are undesirable because the market operates im-
perfectly or contrary to normative social policy objec-
tives, inflation can be seen to be but one such
undesirable phenomenon amongst many. In as much as
an incomes policy may be described as an attempt to
control price levels (that is, the value at which economic
transactions take place) by means of direct government
intervention with contractual rate-setting in respect of
prices and wages, a question does arise as to why infla-
tion warrants such drastic intervention whereas other
redistribution phenomena do not. After all, redistribu-
tion as a result of inflation is not to be equated with an
overall economic loss. By itself, the uneven distribu-
tional effect of inflation merely means that for everyone
who loses there must be a winner. The overall economic
output will not necessarily be affected. This is to be
contrasted sharply with the effect of a recession. Gov-
ernment intervention with market processes would be
much more easily justifiable if used to overcome the loss
... the nature of 'free' collective
bargaining is to give the minimum of
power to unavoidable workers' com-
binations.
of economic output in a recession than if used to rectify
the aberrant market results in a growth economy. It is
pertinent to note here that the governmental tools used
to overcome a recession ought not to be the same as the
ones used to control the uneven redistribution of income
caused by inflation.
Inflation may, of course, have adverse conse-
quences other than uneven redistributional effects. But
none seem to require the drastic interference with the
3. Because it is so difficult to determine at what point of concentra-
tion a market is no longer competitive, legal enforcement is
much more vigorous when economic actors obviously try to
eliminate competition by agreement than when the market has
(apparently) haphazardly become non-competitive in nature. Cf.
R. v. K.C. Irving Limited, [19781 1 S.C.R. 408 (monopolistic
structure, but not unduly harmful to the public), and R. v.
Ocean Construction Supplies Ltd. (1975), 18 C.P.R. (2d) 166
(B.C.C.A.) (clear evidence of pricing conspiracy, conviction).
4. See Barnett, "Corporate Capitalism, Corporate Crime," 27
Crime & Delinquency 4 (1981).
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market which an incomes policy represents. Arguably if
the rate of future inflation is unpredictable, this plays
havoc with long-term contract bargaining. That is, that
optimum condition for free market operation - full in-
formation for market actors - will become even more
difficult to attain than it is usually. But, again, by itself,
this is not such a grave consequence that it merits direct
government intervention in price setting. After all, full
information is hardly ever available to market partici-
pants, even where inflation is not a factor. Further, the
argument is highly theoretical. The evil posited is that a
new difficulty of great dimension may be created by in-
flation. Yet, while it is true that if prices have to be set
for very long periods such as, say, 5 years or more, un-
predictability of the inflation rate may pose a serious
difficulty, it is not likely that insuperable problems will
be created for shorter term contracts. Furthermore, the
rate has not been that unpredictable and, in any event, it
is not impossible for contracting parties to allow for an
adjustment-in-price mechanism to take care of sudden,
unexpected changes in costs. The increasing insertion of
COLA clauses in collective agreements are manifesta-
tions of this ability. Again then, we find a rather shaky
basis for the kind of overriding concern with inflation
that would justify the edifice of an incomes policy.
... incomes policies are offered ... as
incidental tools in the quest for a better
economic condition, but they will,
as a matter of practical politics, very
likely be aimed at restricting wage
earners opportunities to retain (let
alone improve) their share of the na-
tion's wealth.
More persuasive, perhaps, is that the uneven
redistributional effects create distortions in the
economy. Because inflation affects different sectors and
actors at different times, the nature of economic activity
might be affected. Given, however, that inflation does
not affect the overall economic output, this again ought
not to be such a serious consequence as to attract
government intervention of a massive kind.
Perhaps the most serious potential for harm which
inflation has is that it will have an effect on the trade
position of a country because the inflation rate in
economies of trading partners might be of a different
magnitude. If the currency exchange rate of a country is
fixed in accord with some international standard, then
an increase in inflation over that of trading partners will
cause the cost of exports to go up and make the higher
inflation country less competitive. If the currency ex-
change rate is adjustable from time to time, there will be
a gradual decline in exports, leading to a devaluation in
the currency rate, a return to stability, then a slow
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decline, etc. If the currency exchange rate is allowed to
move freely, the inflation rate will not affect the import-
export balance. If the currency exchange rate is not set
by some external standard but kept relatively fixed by a
central bank's intervention, the inflation rate will, if it
exceeds that of trading partners, make exports less com-
petitive. This is Canada's present position. Thus, in as
much as our inflation rate has undesirable trading con-
sequences this is so because of the role the Bank of
Canada plays in our economy. Inflation as such is not
the direct cause of these difficulties. It is, then, an argu-
ment of dubious validity to assert that the normative
policy of intervention with currency rates makes infla-
tion dangerous and, therefore, requires further govern-
mental intervention, in particular an incomes policy
aimed at containing the relatively lesser evil of inflation.
If export/import balances are a serious concern, it
might be useful to focus more on the nature of currency
exchange rate manipulation, it being a more direct cause
of the difficulty sought to be cured than inflation.I
In sum, our present inflationary situation does not,
either in principle or in logic, cry out for government in-
terference with the market by the introduction of in-
comes policies. I assume that incomes policies are
heavy-handed interventions from the point of view of
those who favour the free enterprise economic model.
For others, like Jelly, Weldon and me, incomes policies
are yet another form of attack on the economic well-
being of workers and are, therefore, not welcome. From
either perspective, a better case than presently exists has
to be made out that our inflationary circumstances war-
rants the imposition of any incomes policy. 6
Stagflation as a Justification for
an Incomes Policy
The argument seems to be that a new direction
must be given to the economy because not only do we
have a comparatively high rate of inflation, but we are
5. It must be acknowledged that it may not be within one country's
control to determine effectively its currency exchange rate policy
and that, therefore, inflation control must look very appealing.
But localized inflation control, not being a direct attack on either
imported inflation or internationally created currency problems,
is likely to be ineffective. Satisfactory international currency
agreements and willingness to modify the domestic currency
value would be more useful when attacking the currency pro-
blem.
6. This general commentary is a summary of well-known
arguments opposing wage and price controls as a means to curb
inflation. Their standing as well-established theoretical con-
structs can be measured by the fact that when the Canadian
Labour Congress submitted, as an appendix to its factum in the
Anti-Inflation Reference (1976), 68 D.L.R. (3) 452 (S.C.C.) (in
which the constitutionality of the Am legislation was tested), the
opinion of Richard G. Lipsey, who espoused the arguments sum-
marized in the text, 38 Canadian economists indicated their sup-
port for the Lipsey opinion; see Additional Materials of the
Canadian Labour Congress, 21 May 1976. For a description of
the process, see Hogg "Proof of Facts in Constitutional Cases,"
26 University of Toronto Law J. 386 (1976).
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also experiencing unemployment and show every indica-
tion of being in the midst of a prolonged recessionary
economic period. The trade-off between inflation and
unemployment had been taken for granted until recent-
ly. It was assumed that rising prices meant more
employment opportunities and that deflation meant in-
creases in unemployment. By careful governmental
monetary and fiscal manipulation (that is, the applica-
tion of Keynesian economic theory) an acceptable level
of inflation and employment could be reached. There
was no need to fear cataclysmic imbalances. But, by the
1970s distortions appeared; both inflation and
unemployment increased. I have neither the expertise
nor the ability to offer a detailed analysis of this
phenomenon. But, clearly, some factors underlying its
development include: (a) the decision made by the U.S.
government that it could both finance its Viet Nam
adventures by printing money and keep its vision of a
Great Society alive - the so-called guns and butter
policy of the Johnson Presidency; (b) the collapse of the
currency exchange rate system, the Bretton-Woods
System, in 1970, leading to an abandonment of
an adjustable-peg system which, as was noted
earlier, permitted trading partners to have differing in-
flation rates without great impact on their relative
trading positions, provided that exchange controls and
occasional devaluations were made part of official
policy; (c) the ensuing role played by the Central Bank
in maintaining a particular currency rate; and (d) the
OPEC "crisis". 7
... collective bargaining is integral to
trade unionism which is, in turn, the
working class' response to exploitation
and oppression. Incomes policies
undermine trade unionism.
The resulting economic problem has given rise to
two main responses. The predominant one is mon-
etarism. Crudely, the premise underlying this response
is that our economic difficulties are due to the govern-
ment's insouciant response to extraordinary political/-
economic situations by increasing the money supply to
such an extent that it outstrips, by far, the level of pro-
ductivity. The purpose of this strategy, then, is to
restrain the creation of the money supply and to return
to a state where the predominant economic force is as
untrammelled a private sector market as we can
politically tolerate. There is thus a rejection of the
Keynesian doctrines of monetary and fiscal manipula-
tion of the economy. As part of this revisionism, the
argument is often made that all unnecessary expen-
ditures by government should be halted. Potentially this
hits at the government's welfare expenditures.
Let me pause and note what this prescription does
not, as a matter of logic, require: it does not require the
CANADIAN TAXATION/SUMMER, 1981
introduction of any kind of incomes policy. Indeed, the
essence of the reasoning is that inflation is not due to
imperfect price setting in the market but, rather, is the
result of government interference with the market. As
Professor Laidler points out in his presentation, wage
earners are victims of inflation, just like all other
market actors, not causes of it. Logic, therefore, dic-
tates the position he takes: incomes policies, apart from
their administrative problems, would be counterproduc-
tive to the monetarism which he espouses.'
But there are problems with monetarist theory. For
one thing, it takes a while for it to work. That is, once
imposed, it takes some time before market equilibrium
is restored which, if left alone, leads to growth, a
balance between supply and demand (a relatively non-
inflationary state), and near full use of productive
capacity (a relatively low unemployment rate). Initially,
then, monetarism requires discipline to reduce economic
activity. This, in turn, can be expected to discipline the
work force by causing unemployment. This will have
the additional advantage of lowering the public expecta-
tion of an ever-increasing wage and price spiral. This ex-
pectation is itself a cause of inflation and, unless
dampened, would make the task of monetarism even
more difficult.
The harshness of the monetarist remedy often
arouses the compassion of some monetarists, or at least
they admit political difficulties. It has led some of them
to argue that if some of the discipline (read: lowering of
inflation expectation) can be imposed in other ways, im-
plementation of monetarist policies can be made more
gradual, less nasty.' It is in this context that Bodkin
argues for a TIP scheme. He expects a TIP scheme to have
little effect on inflation, but nonetheless worth trying:
On the benefits side, the reduction in the short-run-trade-
off curve may well be modest; however, if the program is
successful, the acceleration of the past decade can be reduc-
ed without such a large increase in unemployment that
straight monetary discipline would have entailed.' 0
Here, then, is an articulation justifying a form of in-
7. The list is one made up of items most commonly found in
popular discussion. It is not exhaustive. To take but one exam-
ple, inflation could, in part, at least be attributed to the public's
impatience with static distributional patterns, giving rise to the
so-called endless spiral of rising expectations.
8. Laidler, "Tax-Based Incomes Policies and Monetarism," Cana-
dian Taxation (in this issue).
9. Wilton, "Is there a Case for Wage-Price Controls," Canadian
Taxation (in this issue) and authorities cited there.
10. Bodkin, "The Challenge of Inflation and Unemployment in
Canada during the 1980s: Would a Tax-Based Incomes Policy
Help?" 7 Canadian Public Policy 204,212 (1981). Note here that
the main thrust is not the actual reduction of inflation, but the
dampening of expectations. Lipsey, supra note 6, did a survey of
the literature on incomes policies and discovered that, on the
whole, researchers found only insignificant downward changes
in the inflation rate attributable to incomes policies, varying
from zero to two percentage points, with some very rare excep-
tions. See paras. 68-91 of the Appendix to the CLC Factum. It is
easy to see why monetarists who favour TIP's are very modest
about their likely effectiveness.
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comes policy (which Bodkin thinks benign), born not
from logic but from a monetarist 'chicken soup' argu-
ment: monetarism is probably good for you but it hurts;
it may hurt less if its aims - reduction in income and in-
come aspiration - are achieved, in part, in some other
way. An incomes policy, like chicken soup, cannot, in
this context, do any more harm then monetarism will
do, and it may help.
The other economic plan to deal with stagflation
justifies more directly the introduction of incomes
policies. It is put forward by economists to whom David
Crane refers as post-Keynesians.' These people, Crane
summarizes, accept the fact that the Keynesian
economics of the immediate past will no longer ensure
economic health. But they part company with the mone-
tarists on both ideological and political grounds. They
do not share the monetarists' vision that something ap-
proaching an ideal-type market system can ever exist.
Certainly, they would argue that it does not exist now.
From there, they would, as Galbraith does, argue that
the effect of monetarism is unpredictable: how much of
a reduction in money supply leads to a particular quan-
tum reduction in economic activity? And, when such a
reduction takes place, will it occur evenly throughout all
sectors of the economy? Just to focus the difficulties,
note that if the supply of money is diminished,
businesses which have to borrow in an on-going way are
likely to be more heavily affected than others. The pre-
sent slump in the housing sector may well be an illustra-
tion of this. Some businesses, by contrast, may well be
able to self-finance to a considerable extent and thus not
be disciplined directly by the reduction of the money
supply. Further, these doubters of the monetarist faith
do not believe in the existence of a free market but
rather that some sectors of the economy are oligopo-
listic or, in Galbraithian terms, part of the planned
economy. In this sector, increases in labour costs can, so
the reasoning goes, be passed on easily to other pro-
ducers and consumers because of these firms' ability to
administer prices. Consequently, monetarist policy by
itself will not discipline these sectors of the economy
sufficiently or, better put, the needed re-adjustment will
not come as the result of even-handed treatment.12
What the "post-Keynesians" and the monetarists do
share, however, is the belief that the inflation we have
must be dampened. Their remedies follow logically
from their stance. They want to create an atmosphere in
which it becomes accepted that pain will have to be in-
flicted. To help create a consensus for such sacrifices, it
is necessary to make it clear that the sacrifices will be
shared equitably. Thus, an incomes policy in the form
of price administration which prevents distortion by
dominant firms and their unionized workforce suggests
itself as a tool because it can also be designed to dampen
inflation. But, once again, by itself this will not cure the
problem; there is to be restraint, but this will, even in
their compassionate scheme, lead to hardship. Accord-
ingly they favour retaining government expenditures
which maintain public services such as health and
education and support programmes such as unemploy-
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ment and welfare assistance. To make this feasible, they
would attack the malfunctioning of the market. That is,
rather than start from the precept that, if the heavy and
profligate hand of government were removed, truly free
enterprise would be restored and, therefore, economic
well-being ensured, the assumption is that the market
must be restructured because its harmful imperfections
are not self-correcting. An industrial plan or strategy is
recommended. In addition, it is recognized that full
employment and material well-being for all is still a long
way off and that, therefore, the government is to con-
tinue its support for the have-nots, that is, the safety net
is to remain in place. Finally, this brand of policy
makers seems to be divided on whether or not the cen-
tral bank ought to keep the currency rate at a particular
level.'I
Incomes policy, then, is to be part of a restructur-
ing of the economy. Once again, it is assumed that the
present circumstances must not be allowed to persist.
The multi-faceted remedy includes an incomes policy,
but note that it is there, in part, to make sacrifice and
hurt equitable.
Income Policies: One Component of a
General Policy of Worker Restraint
Given the good faith of the theorists whose pro-
grammes would include an incomes policy of some
kind, is it seemly to suggest that these incomes policies
are much more likely to be implemented as instruments
of worker oppression than as devices aimed at bringing
the economy around for the eventual and enduring good
of all? The argument in support of this stance falls into
three parts. First, a hortatory argument about the
politics and nature of recent incomes policies will be
11. Crane, "Stagflation and the Economic Crisis," in D. Crane, ed.,
Beyond the Monetarists, Post-Keynesian Alternatives to Ram-
pant Inflation, Low Growth and High Unemployment (Ottawa:
Canadian Institute for Economic Policy, 1981), p. 1 . The occa-
sion for the paper was a conference where the debate took place
between those who saw themselves as monetarists and others,
whom Crane and the Conference Organizers called post-
Keynesians. Although I accept Professor Weldon's rebuke that
the expression post-Keynesian is not very precise (note 2), 1 use
the expression as Crane used it, viz., to gather together, under
one heading, a large variety of views which can be seen to be a
category which may be juxtaposed to monetarism. But not all the
"post-Keynesians" participating in the Conference agreed with
the overall strategy which I attribute to them in the text. For in-
stance, Tarshis, "The Canadian Economy in an International
Setting," id., p. 26, would cut taxes, reduce some regulation and
change the exchange rates, by way of remedy. And, of course,
Professor Weldon who commented on the paper delivered by
Weintraub at the Conference, did not think an incomes policy an
appropriate mechanism to treat our economic ills (at p. 78). The
above text then is to be understood as being an idealized version
of the dominant economic trend opposing monetarism. It is not
the only form of opposition, but I believe Crane to be accurate in
his assessment of its prominence in current public policy debate.
12. Galbraith, "The Conservative Onslaught," in D. Crane, ed.,
supra note 11, p. 10, at 17-18.
13. See, for examples, Tarshis, supra note II.
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made. Second, a very brief historical sketch of the
nature of incomes policies. Third, an argument to the
effect that, despite widely-held public views to the con-
trary, wage earners are already subject to externally im-
posed income restraining mechanisms of a very fettering
kind.
A. The hortative
Here the argument offered is that, whatever the
academic arguments for an incomes policy, they are
unlikely to yield the results sought. Indeed, these goals
may not be sought by the decision-makers who imple-
ment the policies. They may be after different game,
while using the weapons provided by the economists.
Very generally, economists have provided two kinds of
theoretical justifications for an incomes policy.
1. The monetarists who support an incomes policy
do so to help soften the effect of their macroeconomic
policy and to help dampen inflationary expectations. As
noted earlier, it is clear that one of the aims is to
decrease economic activity and, therefore, anything
... the rules have been devised so that
collective action has as little impact as
possible over and above that made by
individual bargaining.
which works towards that, is a blow to workers' aspira-
tions. But, even if one accepts as fact the expression of
faith that stringent monetarism will bring the economy
around, there is a question about the time frame which
will be required to bring about this success. Theoretical-
ly, the rationale for an incomes policy will disappear
when free enterprise is in equilibrium again. What does
this mean for the incomes policy instrument at its point
of implementation? If, as the argument runs, it is to be
instituted, in part, to dampen the inflationary expecta-
tion of wage demanders, how will it do this if people
know the programme is only a temporary one? Is there
to be an indication that the temporary period will be a
long one, perhaps, forever? In this context, note that
Weintraub, one of the architects of the particular in-
comes policy instrument under discussion - TIP -
thinks it should remain in place for ever.14 It is plausible
that, if it is meant to be temporary, an incomes policy
may not have the desired effect of dampening the infla-
tionary expectation, because demands which can be
passed on will escalate as soon as controls are
removed." If, alternatively, the incomes policy is in-
troduced on the basis that it will remain in place forever,
its effect on inflationary rate expectations might be just
what is hoped for by the monetarist-cum-incomes policy
proponents, but the raison d'etre for its creation, viz., to
help abolish the need for all interference with the
market in due course, such as incomes policies, would
be eliminated.1 6 In view of these arguments, it is not
unreasonable to suggest that wise politicians who
understand these difficulties may have other reasons to
introduce an incomes policy than those offered by this
brand of monetarists, even though in public they might
rely on the theoretical arguments so readily made
available.
Let me explore this possibility by a brief reference
to the AIB experience. As recounted by Wilton, the AIB
legislation had, as its given rationale, the notion that the
inflation rate expectation had to be lowered. The legisla-
tion did, in fact, succeed in restraining wage increases.
It had alarmingly little effect, however, on the rate of
inflation. This came about because there were no effec-
tive price controls on food and energy.'I (Nor, may it be
added, were there adequate controls over high-earning
sectors of self-employed professionals). That is,
whatever the rhetoric used, the effect of the AIB legisla-
tion was to repress workers' economic hopes. Skeptics
might, therefore, argue with some force that the bottom
line result was the aim, and the reasons given for the
programme's creation were nought but handy window
dressing. Might the same not be true of the new incomes
policies which are being considered? To give this ques-
tion a little more bite, consider the incomes policy under
review, a tax-based incomes policy.
In logic, there is no reason why it should not apply
to prices as well as wages. Thus, it should be possible to
avoid the situation which arose under the AIB and, by
controlling both prices and wages, achieve the twin ob-
jectives of an equitable sharing of restraint (short-term
pain) and a lowering of the inflationary rate expecta-
tions. But Okun, one of the most persuasive proponents
of TIP schemes, warned that political reality would not
permit anything like an ideal-type TIP to be put into
place.' 8 One matter that politicians will have to con-
sider, of course, is administrative efficiency. There is no
dearth of expert opinion to the effect that to include
14. Weintraub, "A Prices and Incomes Policy" in D. Crane, ed.,
supra note 11, p.67.
15. Wilton, supra note 9, and Crowley, "Income Controls, Collec-
tive Bargaining and Unions," Canadian Taxation (this issue)
both note that there was no explosion in wage demands after AIB
ended. But this may be due to a variety of factors, including the
success of the programme. There is only a logical connection bet-
ween an incomes control policy and reduced inflationary expec-
tations, if all other things (such as foreign trade conditions, level
of competition and political continuity) stay constant. And, even
if there is no wage explosion after removal of temporary con-
trols, if inflation has not actually been diminished because of the
exclusion of major prices from control (such as food, energy, as
happened in the AIB period), the inflationary expectation will not
be diminished; see Wilton, supra note 9.
16 Note here that the list of economists who favour permanent in-
comes policies is headed by Galbraith, an avowed anti-
monetarist, and Kaldor and Harrod, economists who believe
that central banks have lost control over the money supply and
therefore favour direct, permanent and severe economic regula-
tion by government; see Lipsey, Appendix to CLC Factum,
supra note 6, paras. 70-72.
17. Wilton, supra note 9.
18. Okun "Discussion of a paper by Lawrence S. Seidman" in 2
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 253. (Cited by Bodkin,
note 10, p. 204.).
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prices in a TIP scheme would complicate its administra-
tion unduly. The difficulties with gauging a price in-
crease apparently outweigh those of calculating wage
rate increases by a great deal.19 If such opinions are
given sway, the created TIP scheme is likely to be ap-
plicable only to the wage sector. Bodkin, in his argu-
ment in support of a reward-based TIP, recognizes the
political difficulty: it will be hard to convince workers
of the equity of a restraint programme, instituted for
the good of all, which only applies to them. He
therefore suggests that prices should also be brought
within the scope of the TIP scheme and he offers some
means for doing this. But, at the same time, he
acknowledges that such efforts could never include all
prices. He notes, for example, that prices of exported
goods should not be controlled in a scheme aimed at the
domestic inflation rate. He writes:
Indeed, it may be argued that it is in a country's national in-
terest to receive the highest prices that it can extract for its
exports, regardless of the degree of competitiveness of the
markets in which these goods and services are sold. 20
In a similar vein, it might well be deemed to be in
the national interest to exclude some domestic prices
from the scope of a TIP scheme; such as the AIB legisla-
tion permitted in respect of food and energy. The up-
shot, once again, would be a system of control primarily
aimed at wage earners' income in the name of theories
which, in good faith and logic, require the opposite. If,
as is the thesis of this paper, this is precisely why politi-
cians favour incomes policies, labour should rightly be
suspicious of economic theories which favour incomes
policies as incidental instruments in the battle to achieve
utopian goals. The tail is likely to wag the dog to death.
Here I would like to make two anecdotal points
which strike me as being revelatory of the dangers (for
workers) lurking in these neutral-sounding proposals
for incomes' policies. Donner and Peters favour a TIP
scheme which would punish corporations that permitted
socially unacceptable wage increases. The reasoning
underlying this is to stiffen the employers' backbone
when bargaining. 21 Weintraub also argues for this and
has defended his point of view by pointing out that TIPS
are not anti-union, nor anti-business, but merely anti-
inflationary by inhibiting collective bargaining. 22 To
labour unions which have fought desperately for their
collective bargaining rights and which believe that only
their existence has given workers a tenuous stake in this
economic society, these arguments must sound a little
disingenuous. To anti-working class politicians, the
thinking and phraseology of these respected theoreti-
cians must sound very attractive. 23
The possibility of incomes policies becoming
worker oppression devices is very real, no matter what
motivates their theoretical proponents. By contrast, the
likelihood of such incomes policies achieving their
theoretical supporters' aims are slim.
2. If incomes policies are implemented on the
strength of the arguments put forward by post-
Keynesians, similar protestations can be made. In the
first instance, it must be remembered that the incomes
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policy instrument is meant to be part of a total package.
This programme includes an industrial strategy or plan.
By this is meant some deliberate restructuring of the
market, bolstering potential growth areas and excising
inefficient sectors. The notion that such deliberate cen-
tralized planning is to occur must present the theoreti-
cians with some intellectual anxiety. After all, one of the
basic arguments opposing the introduction of incomes
policies is that they cause misallocation of resources.
This problem is accentuated if the intervention with
market forces is directly allocative, a bureaucratic spell-
ing out of which market activity is desirable and which
is not. There will be reservations amongst the policy
makers; there will be real difficulties.2 4 Above all, the
development of an industrial strategy will take time.
Devising an incomes policy, however, is a relatively easy
matter. Are the politicians likely to wait for the in-
dustrial strategy to be put into place? The question
seems rhetorical. Politicians will claim that they are
engaged in overall industrial planning and that integral
to this is an arrest to inflation. That is, that part of the
package which can be implemented immediately will be,
with the politicians in a position to claim that they are
acting on the advice of the proponents of the package.
In such circumstances the incomes policy would be
effective before the rest of the package. The sacrifice
would already be made, but the overall goals sought to
be achieved by the total programme might be no nearer.
Now, if the incomes policy instrument chosen is a TIP
scheme, then the argument in the foregoing section
about the likely narrowness of its scope, becomes very
significant. If the TIP scheme, as is probable, is mainly
aimed at restricting wage earners' demands, then the
sacrifice will, in the absence of any other concrete pro-
gramme, not only be inequitable, but also futile. Yet,
politicians, like a conglomerate Pontius Pilate, might
very well argue that they are actively seeking to bring the
19. Weintraub, supra note 14, p. 76, makes this point. In addition,
he argues that price levels, being reflective of productivity and
labour costs, will not need to be controlled if labour costs are.
See also Hunsiker, "Tax-Based Incomes Policy as an Alternative
to Wage and Price Controls," 14 University of Michigan J. of
Law Reform 267, 276-77 (1980-81).
20. Bodkin, supra note 10, p. 206.
21. Donner and Peters, The Monetarist Counter-Revolution: A
Critique of Canadian Monetary Policy 1975-1979 (Ottawa:Cana-
dian Institute for Economic Policy, 1979), pp. 46-50.
22. Weintraub, supra note 14, p. 75.
23. Donner & Peters, supra note 21, recognize that a TIP scheme may
appear anti-labour and caution that it ought to be accompanied
by a policy stimulating job creation.
24. As well as the indicated difficulties, there are many others
perceived by believers in our existing political economy. E.g., the
danger to the body politic of centralization of decision-making
of this kind, the adjustments to be made in respect of foreign
competition (should Canada and US combine to oppose
Japan?), the difficulties of Canada's regional imbalances, the
imponderables of how changeover from an era of reliance on
non-renewable resources to one of renewable sources ought to be
made, the impact of the industrial strategy on Third and Fourth
World nations, etc. For a summarizing discussion see Crane, ed.,
supra note 11, chs. 7 & 8.
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economy around. What more could they do, they will
ask, but think hard about the very difficult task of in-
dustrial planning and make an honest attempt at re-
straining unconscionable wage demands by powerful
unions? This is not a fanciful notion of the political pro-
cess. After all, a rational politician would find it quite
difficult to eliminate an industry which, although ineffi-
cient, employs a great number of persons directly and
indirectly.2 5 Such decisions are best left to the anarchy
of the market. Indeed, it is reasonably comfortable to
ponder such questions for a long time while imposing an
always popular incomes policy (with sonorous, regretful
rhetoric), which the electorate knows will hit hard at a
traditionally unloved target, unions.
B. A sketch of incomes policies over the eons
Crowley notes the persistence of incomes policies
over recent times. He concludes that this indicates that it
is probable that incomes policies of some sort are here
to stay. 26 He is right. Indeed, there is more evidence of
the frequent resort to legislative and other incomes
policies than he cites. The list is very long. There are 3
stages of development to note. Two will be dealt with in
this section, the other in the next section.
Weldon 27 began his paper with a reference to the in-
famous 1349 Ordinance of Labourers,2 8 which became
the Statute of Labourers in 1351.29 Let us commence
there.
1. As everyone knows, the Statute of Labourers was
the legislative response to the terrible catastrophe
known as the Black Death. The plague cut the popula-
tion of England in half, from an estimated 3 to 4 million
to 1 V2 to 2 million people. Outbreaks of the plague
beleaguered England until 1369. Not surprisingly, the
price of food increased as wage earners asked for in-
creases in rates for their scarce services. Note that the
situation was considered chronic even though in that
feudal time there were comparatively few persons who
worked for wages. The Statute of Labourers required all
persons who worked for wages to work for any master
who commandeered them. They were to do the work at
wages set by local justices (the forerunner of the AIB ad-
ministrators or TIP controllers). They could not leave
their master without permission. The penalty was
severe: their forehead would be branded with the letter
"F", for fugitive. Any master who enticed away a
worker from another master was criminally responsible,
as was any master who paid a worker at a higher rate
than the justices had decreed.
This, then, was a rather savage wage control
system. But, lest this be shrugged aside as symbolic of a
barbaric and pre-capitalist time, it ought to be noted
that at least this income policy was introduced at a time
when there was a dire shortage of labour. Our proposals
to force workers to make sacrifices comes at a time
when there is a surplus of labour.
Although everyone seems to know about the
Statute of Labourers, hardly anyone seems to know of
the fact that statutes of this kind were passed with
monotonous regularity until 1562. For instance, in
1389, during Richard II's reign, there was a shortage of
corn. Prices went up and, with them, upward pressure
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on wages was felt. The statutory response was to control
the price of corn and to continue to set wages in the
same way as the much more traumatic period of the
Black Death had dictated.3 0
As this is not an attempt at a legal historical
analysis, but rather a sketch to support the argument
that incomes policies have a very long history, the next
stopping place is the very famous Statute of Apprentices
of 1562.32 This time, a conflation of reasons gave rise to
the legislation. Henry VIII had suppressed the
monasteries and taken much of their land. Large
numbers of workers were released into the community.
Workers were there to be exploited. Simultaneously, the
craft guilds had sufficient influence to ask for regula-
tion ensuring their autonomy and economic security. In-
deed, the prescriptions they obtained about the per-
missible ratio of number of apprentices to journeymen
and the rates to be paid to such apprentices gave the
legislation its name. At the same time, however, the
statute, like its predecessors of the previous two cen-
turies, required that workers' wages were to be set by
justices of the peace. It spelt out in great detail the
number of hours to be worked and the length of service
that had to be given. Given the different manpower
situation to the days of the plagues, workers did not
have to work for anyone who asked them, but once
employed could not leave for at least 12 months, nor
could an employer dismiss them before such a period
had elapsed.
At this stage, then, there had been a pattern of
direct imposition of controls over workers' income for
over 200 years. It might be argued that these incomes-
cum-manpower policies are not to be equated with our
modern day versions because they were created at a time
when the notions of free market enterprise with its
dogma that a worker, like all other market actors, is an
individual whose voluntary decision to buy or sell must
be deemed to be that of a sovereign unit, were non-
existent. Hence incomes policies were not interferences
with a free market economy and did not require the
same kind of justification they do to-day. Thus, just
25. Much easier for politicians is to give particularized grants to
favoured firms, tax advantages for exports, localized invest-
ment, research and development, and the like. The ad hoc nature
of such programmes is endemic as they usually arise out of reac-
tions to particular situations.
26. Crowley, supra note 15.
27. Supra note 2.
28. (1349), 23 Edw. 3.
29. (1351), 25 Edw. 3, St. 2.
30. Labourers' Wages, etc. (1389), 13 Ric. c. 8. For other statutes,
see Labourers'Act, 34 Edw. 3, cc. 9-11 (1361); Labourers'Act,
42 Edw. 3, c. 6 (1368); Labourers'Act, 4 Hen. 4, c. 14 (1402);
Labourers'Act, 7 Hen. 4, c. 17 (1405); Wages'Act, 2 Hen. 5 St.
2, c. 2 (1414); Labourers'Act, 2, Hen. 6, c. 18 (1423); Labourers'
Act, 3 Hen. 6, c. 1 (1424); Wages of Artificers, 6 Hen. 6, c. 3
(1427); Labourers' Act, 8 Hen. 6, c. 8 (1429); Wages of
Labourers, etc., 4 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1512); Artificers and Labourers
Act, 6 Hen. 8, c. 3 (1514); Journeymen Act, 3 & 4 Edw. 6, c. 22
(1549).
31. Statute of Artificers, 5 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1562).
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because modern incomes policies take a form analogous
to that of those described does not indicate that they
would have the same spirit underlying them to-day. My
riposte is two-fold. First, I note again that the incomes
policies adopted the same administrative form as many
of our modern instruments: a regulation of income to be
overseen by neutral administrators. Second, while they
were primarily addressed at controlling the rates of pay
and availability of labour, they also required employers
to comply with certain obligations in respect of both
wages and prices. Thus, for whatever reason, the deci-
sion-makers of the day saw a need for some apparent
evenhandedness in the design of their instruments. And,
in a similar vein, I would point out that whatever ra-
tionale was given for the programmes (lack of labour,
too much labour, shortages of commodities leading to
high prices), their orientation seemed to be, in fact,
unidirectional: the workers, as opposed to masters, were
to be the most inhibited, the ones to make most of the
sacrifice which the national interest required to be
made. The bottom line of the AIB scheme, then, was at-
tained by incomes policies devised in pre-capitalist
times. Is such a coincidence to be ignored?
2. The Statute of Apprentices became a thorn in the
economic body almost as soon as it had been enacted.
Through the seventeenth and eighteenth century new
modes of production developed at a tremendous pace.
The craft guilds lost their importance. Workers
migrated to the cities. The new enterprises no longer
corresponded to the masters of earlier days. With an
abundance of workers becoming available to them as
the old relationships withered away, they favoured in-
dividual bargaining for wages over the rate-setting pro-
vided for by legislation. The economic reality was such
that the use of the Statute of Apprentices in respect of
the fixation of wages diminished sharply. By 1776
Adam Smith wrote that the fixation of wages by justices
of the peace had fallen into disuse entirely. 32
Thus, it appears that the legislative incomes policy
disappeared with the advent of capitalism. But does this
mean that there was, in fact, no incomes policy which,
as usual, oppressed workers? After all, it is not
necessary to have a legislative instrument to have a legal
programme. What occurred here is that at the point of
time when the legislative scheme restricting workers
demands was, in effect, giving workers more than they
could obtain by unrestricted demand, they were given
the 'freedom' to make their demand untrammelled by
statutory prescription. The courts came to be the ad-
ministrators of the new incomes policy. Legal
philosophers and political economists have hailed the
legal revolution from status (represented in our context
by the Statute of Apprentices) to contract (represented
in our context by the judicial recognition of freedom to
contract for wages):" no longer would individuals'
rights and duties stem from their position, but rather
they would arise from their merit, skill and luck, as
reflected in their bargaining stance. Whatever the
philosophical merits of the argument, what is notable
here is that the new utopia brought severe hardship to
workers. That is, the restraint of workers by statutory
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means had been removed, but only in a context which
ensured greater constriction of their ability to obtain a
larger share of the pie. If you will, here is an illustration
of the phenomenon that when a direct instrument of
restraint is not necessary because workers are confined
by other means, it will be removed. A very strong in-
ference to the effect that, whatever the reasons given for
their creation, incomes policies are only seen as useful to
restrain workers' aspirations, is thus raised.
To underscore the point, it is pertinent to note that,
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
workers struggled desperately to have the Statute of Ap-
prentices applied to them. There are records of workers
celebrating because they were successful in getting
justices of the peace to set their wage rates, rather than
leave them to the vagaries of free contracting about
their working conditions. There are instances of
workers' associations instituting criminal prosecutions
The bias is clear. Collective bargaining
is a right which had to be given. But, it
is given so that it will have as little im-
pact as possible.
to have the Statute of Apprentices enforced. And there
were endless number of petitions presented to Parlia-
ment to have it ensure the enforcement of the Statute.3 4
None of this worked: apparently the new economic
forces were too strong. The courts which, in my inter-
pretation, were given the task of replacing the legislative
restraining instruments did so positively. Thus, in 1811 a
court which had been asked by workers to force justices
of the peace to meet to set rates, ruled that while the
Statute of Apprentices did require justices of the peace
to meet it did not specifically oblige them to set rates in
any particular instance. It therefore directed the justices
to meet and left it to their discretion as to whether or not
they should fix wage rates." Note here that one of the
contributory factors to the desuetude of the Statute of
Apprentices was the fact that its chief administrators,
justices of the peace, were largely culled from the class
which stood to gain most from its abandonment.
The argument that the demise of the Statute of Ap-
prentices as a control instrument was, at least, in part
due to the fact that a more efficient control scheme over
workers was made available by developments in the
common law instituted by a willing and innovative
judiciary is supported by another well-known aspect of
the Industrial Revolution.
32. A. Smith, Wealth of Nations (London: Penguin Books, 1974), p.
245.
33. H. Maine, Ancient Law (London: John Murray, 1861), ch. 5.
34. See H. Ruegg, Law of Employer and Workman in England
(London: W. Clowes and Sons, 1905), pp. 14-25.
35. R. v. Justices of Kent (1811), 14 East 395.
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However fine a ring 'freedom to bargain' has to our
modern ears, it has been seen that workers of the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries were not enamoured of
this liberating precept. More important than their ef-
forts to keep the Statute of Apprentices alive was their
natural reaction to individual bargaining. They were
getting creamed and, therefore, sought to collectivize
their efforts. They formed trade unions. The legal
system's conversion to individualistic contract notions
led both the legislature and the judiciary to outlaw all
collective actions, especially those of workers. This
story is well known. Statutes forbade combinations. As
workers' oppression grew they risked corporal punish-
ment and deportation in order to combine. The legisla-
ture, more responsive to this mass movement than the
judiciary, gradually removed its fetters. The judiciary
stubbornly refused to do so. Imaginative readings were
given by it to statutes which apparently gave collective
activity some protection, rendering the protection
nugatory. Trade union bargaining activity was con-
tinously harassed. It eventually came to be accepted, but
only to some extent.3 6 What does this mean in the con-
text of the argument being made here?
First, it is interesting to point out for the sake of
those who would dismiss the pre-capitalist develop-
ments as irrelevant that in the nineteeth century battles
the courts used a legal off-shoot of the 1349 Black
Death legislation as one of their most powerful tools in
their repression of trade unions. The tort of inducing
breaches of contract is a direct descendant of the four-
teenth century statute's criminal prohibition against one
master enticing another master's worker away. 7 That
is, the instrument used to coerce and restrain
workers during the feudal period was reborn in the
springtime of capitalism. Note that in both periods the
tool was used to restrain workers who might be a scarce
(and therefore costly) commodity, even though the
reasons for the scarcity were different.
Second, judges, unlike legislatures, cannot have
different rules for different classes in respect of the
same situation. The common law derives much of its
legitimacy from its claim to being administered by neu-
tral judges bound by rules of universal application. Yet,
in their attacks on collective action, the courts treated
concerted activities by enterprisers (which had not at-
tracted any protective legislation) with kindness, finding
ways to condone them. In contrast, they had no ap-
parent difficulty overriding statutory protections when
smashing directly analogical workers' combinations."
Once again, then, there is evidence that, once it was
recognized that workers could be restrained more effec-
tively by forcing them to bargain as individuals rather
than by fixing their wage rates, the courts took up the
burden to compel them to bargain individually with
some relish. To fail to recognize that this normative
judicial rule-making acted as an effective wage control
system would be to bury one's head in the sands of legal
mystification. To hear some experts who support
modern incomes policies blandly announce that they are
not anti-union, 9 but merely anti-collective bargaining,
sounds hollow from the historical perspective just of-
fered: unionism is collective bargaining!
Third, it may be remarked that what the courts did
had nothing to do with public policy. Rather, their anti-
collectivist approach was part of a larger picture in which
they, as an institution, were responding to social changes
and that this approach became distorted when dealing
with trade unions because they were members of a class
which could not accept the notion of workers as sover-
eign individuals and, thus, in a general anti-collectivist
climate, twisted the law to give vent to their personal
and classs biases. This explanation is currently still
popular. 4 0 Yet it is unsatisfactory. Remember that
courts used old causes of action and invented new ones
with which to whip trade unions. While it is true that
legislation was passed from time to time to overcome
difficulties created for trade unions and collective
bargaining by the courts, the legislature never used its
power to liberate collective bargaining from interference
by individual rights' supporting courts. The help given
to trade unions in respect of collective bargaining was
always in the form of providing immunities from the
courts' great excesses. At no stage were the politicians so
at odds with the courts' attempts at restraining workers'
demands that they felt moved to end these attempts.
36. The story of judiciary intransigence in the face of legislative sen-
sitivity to a changing political climate is well-known. For a good
account, see W. Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law, 2 ed.
(London: Penguin Books, 1971).
37. Classically, the tort is committed when A, under contract with B,
is induced by C to leave B, in breach of her or his contract to B,
to join C. Note that workers prevailing on employees not to con-
tinue to sell their labour unless certain conditions are met will
commit this tort. That is, a call for a strike is made legally ac-
tionable and therefore, preventible. This weapon, in modified
form, remains available to employers.
38. See the famous trilogy of cases: Mogul Steamship Company v.
McGregor, Gow & Company, [1892] A.C. 25 (H.L.) which made
it permissible for employers to combine to further their trade in-
terests; Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. I (H.L.) and Quinn v.
Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495 (H.L.) which made it an unlawful act
for workers to combine to further their economic interests. It
was not until 1942 that the House of Lords recognized that
workers and their trade unions might have legitimate interests
they could pursue by combination; Crofter Hand Woven Harris
Tweed Co. v. Veitch, [19421 A.C. 435. Note that at that time
workers needed to be appeased. In any event, other legal
restraints were soon invented. See Wedderburn, supra note 35.
39. Weintraub, supra note 14.
40. It takes the form of stating that courts are anti-union because
they are anti-collectivist and do not understand the great changes
in the world arising out of trade unionism. Frequently, it is
argued, this blindness leads to incoherent doctrine. See, eg.,
Finkelman, "The Law of Picketing in Canada," 2 University of
Toronto Law J. 67 (1937-39); Arthurs, "Tort Liability for Strikes
in Canada," 38 Canadian Bar Review 346 (1960); Beatty, "Secon-
dary Boycotts: A Functional Analysis," 52 Canadian Bar Review
388 (1974); I. Christie, Liability of Strikers in the Law of Torts
(Kingston: I.R.C., Queen's University, 1967). However in-
coherent the judicial reasoning is (and it is), note that the out-
come is always the same: repression of workers' combinations.
Lack of understanding could not achieve this; focussed bias
might. Bias supported by public approbation certainly would.
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Their policy was to bend with the political times, but
never to enunciate, let alone to implement, a clearly
stated public policy of free collective bargaining for the
unions. This is as true today as it was in 1875.41 The
significance of this will be taken up in the next section.
In sum, incomes policies can take various guises. But
no matter what form they took - direct coercive restraints
or relatively passive, even apparently permissive, legislative
action combined with repressive judicial controls - the
bottom line was oppression of workers. But there were
always, as there are to-day, good public policy rationalia
for the introduction of the repressive measures. Would it
thus not be foolish for labour as a class not to be mistrust-
ful of the new-fangled incomes policies offered on the
basis that, for the good of all, our economic direction
must be changed?
C. Some existing legislative restraints on free col-
lective bargaining
In this final section devoted to showing that the
tradition of public policy is to constrain workers' demands
and that, therefore incomes policies ought to be viewed as
just one more overt attempt to further this policy, the
focus will be on other contemporary legal instruments ar-
tificially inhibiting workers' chances of economic advance-
ment, that is, legal devices restraining workers' demands.
It has already been noted that the only realistic means
with which workers can combat the dominance that
ownership of the means of production gives employers in
the bargaining game is collective action. The acceptance of
collective bargaining as a legitimate mode of settling work-
ing conditions is a recognition of this fact, a recognition
which, it has been seen, did not come without bitter strug-
gle. Collective bargaining can be characterized as being
contrary to the notions of the ideal-type market economy
in as much as it permits the creation of monopoly over
labour, one of the commodities to be bought and sold in a
free enterprise society. This 'imperfection' is justified on
the basis that, without it, injustice would result. This ad-
justment having been made, the parties are to be left free
to operate in the traditional market-mode. This line of
argument has engendered a belief that workers have been
handed a boon which enables them to look after them-
selves very well. Indeed, the argument is often heard that
they have been given too much market power by this legal
artifice, causing distortion in allocation of resources and
inflation. The truth is a long way from this. When it
became politically impossible to stop workers from using
collective action, the political adaptation was typical. A
scheme was created whereby the illusion of lack of
restraint was created, but serious restraints were put on the
use of power. Indeed, once it was acknowledged that trade
unions would be formed so that workers could press their
demands in concert, whether or not this was legal, the best
that could be done by decision-makers interested in en-
suring that the workers' share of market proceeds be kept
to a minimum was to control the form and scope of
collective bargaining so that it would not yield results
dramatically different from those obtained under a more
favourable (that is, workers as individual contractors')
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situation.42 They have been remarkably successful. Collec-
tive bargaining in Canada is far from free. Space does not
permit anything more than an itemization of the fetters
which exist, but this should give a feeling for the 'unfree'
nature of collective bargaining.
1. Collective bargaining legislation permits concerted
action by workers only in the context of the particular em-
ployee for whom they work. If collective bargaining is seen
as a market imperfection, one can readily see the reason
for this restriction: permission for workers to coalesce over
a wider area would be too great an imperfection, an over-
correction of the hardship caused to workers when forced
to bargain as individuals. What must not be permitted, it
seems, is to give workers real power. 43 The 'One Big
Union' is a real danger. The question that must be asked,
however, is whether the limitation of bargaining rights to
one employer at a time will redress the balance sufficiently
to overcome the acknowledged weakness of workers. Con-
sider two situations.
It is a commonplace to think of the Steelworkers
Union as a mighty economic force. If all its members
could act in concert vis-a-vis any employer anywhere who
employed any of their members, the union's bargaining
strength might truly be great. But, is it obvious that the
10,000 workers who are represented 1y the Steelworkers
Union local at Inco have anything like tne economic power
of their employer? Has the right to 'free collective bar-
gaining' really created a countervailing force which
adequately redresses the imbalance in economic where-
withal, even allowing for the fact that the local union will
be helped by the administrative expertise of the central of-
fices of the union? Or, take the recent unsavoury happen-
ings at Radio Shack in Barrie, Ontario. There the employ-
er practised ugly deeds of illegal skulduggery against its
employees. It sought to stop a union from forming. It used
informers, infiltrators, agents provocateur. It delayed bar-
gaining. It sought to reduce existing workers' rights. It
played by the individualistic market rules. This is not per-
missible. Yet the workers, members of that apparently im-
41. In 1875, there was legislation making trade unions immune from
criminal prosecutions, provided that they acted in a particular
context (a trade dispute as defined), in a particular way (as
described), Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875, 38
& 39 Vict. c. 86. Ironically the form of our allegedly most
liberating statute, the British Columbia Labour Code, S.B.C.
1973 (2nd. session) c. 122, is the same: unions are immune from
judicial decision-making, provided that their conduct falls within
the four corners of a labour dispute as defined by the Code and is
of the kind described therein.
42. The particular form of collective bargaining we have was copied
from the U.S. model. There it had been introduced, in part, to
enable workers make sufficient headway to help increase ag-
gregate demand. But it was not intended that it should do more
than that. In Canada, the introduction of the collective bargain-
ing schemes we have came with the need to appease labour dur-
ing World War II. Thereafter, the 'gift' was limited in its ambit.
43. De facto industry-wide bargaining does take place, for instance,
in the automobile industry. But this hardly threatens employers.
Ironically, note that where legislation - the explicit statement of
public policy permits it, it does so because industry-wide
bargaining helps employers, as in the construction industry in
Ontario or the railways in British Columbia.
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mensely powerful union, the Steelworkers, had to beg for
help from the Ontario Labour Relations Board. A con-
tract was eventually reached, with no great certainty that
the union will be able to exact another one. 4 4 The size of
the union was of little help to the workers because of the
nature of the 'free' collective bargaining permitted by legis-
lation. As an aside, note that the employer, an individual,
was not in any way prohibited in getting assistance from its
parent company. This, of course, looks evenhanded
because the Steelworkers' central office could provide the
local members with administrative and economic assistance.
But, apart from the fact that the parent company could
give greater financial assistance than the union, note that
the employer could always close its operation, provided it
did so for 'business reasons'. Is the right of workers to quit
and take another job a power of the same magnitude?
If our form of collective bargaining as a whole might
be seen as sufficient to redress the ghastly imbalance of
market power between capitalists and workers, it will only
be fortuitous if in any one case something approaching
parity in bargaining power will be the result of the legis-
lative system's machinery. That is, the nature of 'free'
collective bargaining is to give the minimum of power to
unavoidable workers' combinations.
2. Inherent in the 'one employer - local union' model
of collective bargaining is the proposition that the union
cannot deploy its forces so as to put pressure on the em-
ployer's trading partners to break commercial ties with it.
The only exception (and it is narrow) to this rule that
secondary boycotts are not to be permitted, arises where
the interests of the secondary boycott target and the
primary employer are so intertwined that they are deemed
to be allies. Not only does the legislation not expressly
permit such "secondary" activity but it also falls foul of the
common law rules developed by the nineteenth century
judiciary, as complemented by innovative court decisions
of this century, indeed of this decade. 45
Once again, then, the right to economically pressure
an employer is a diluted one. Whether one thinks this right
or wrong is of little importance. What is significant is that,
quite arbitrarily (in the sense that one cannot know
whether in any one particular case the limitation on union
power is justified on the basis that the weakness of the
workers concerned has been overcome sufficiently to
satisfy our public sense of fairness), the scope of collective
bargaining is restricted, with the inevitable result that the
outcome of negotiations will be more favourable to em-
ployers than it would have been if collective bargaining
had been truly "free".
3. While a trade union may use its ultimate econ-
omic weapon, a concerted withdrawal of labour, it can-
not prevent the employer from continuing its operation.
This, admittedly, makes good market sense. The trade
union will want to persuade other persons from helping
the employer. In the name of another social value -
freedom of speech - it may inform other people about
its view of the dispute in order to enlist their support.
But it is not permitted to do more than that; in par-
ticular, in most jurisdictions it cannot stop scab labour
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from doing the work of its members who are on strike.
Again, note the fortuity of these provisions. In
some cases, they will not help employers; in others they
may. That is, once again there is no a priori reasoning
why the cut-off line on potential union bargaining
power should be at one point rather than another. In-
deed, this is shown by the fact that in some jurisdic-
tions 46 employers are prohibited from using scab
labour. The explanation may be offered that the cut-off
line is a compromise between free market principles and
the need to bolster collective workers' activity, but note
that the compromise reached in the majority of juris-
dictions is at the point least favourable to workers.
Again, in as much as the limitation has an overall effect
on outcomes, the hope is that the results obtained by
'free' collective action will deviate as little as possible
from that obtainable in the absence of combinations.
4. The collective bargaining legislation legitimates
strike activity by workers, but not all the time. Strikes
are only permitted after long periods of notice have
elapsed. In the case where no agreement exists, a minis-
try must, after good faith negotiation attempts fail, be
given notice of impasse. Then, the parties must meet
with external conciliators/mediators. If no agreement
ensues, a further time period must be allowed to pass by
before a strike can legally take place. Where an agree-
ment exists, the agreement must first have terminated
before any of these steps can be set into motion. This
brief summary indicates that the union may not be in a
position to use its most powerful tool when it would be
most effective. Indeed, the opposite may well be true: as
the procedural requirements make the timing of a strike
highly predictable, it is often feasible for an employer to
arrange its affairs (by stockpiling, planning alternate
supply mechanisms with competitors, etc.) so as to
minimize the impact of strike action.
Note also that workers may not strike during the
life of a collective agreement. The argument is that the
parties have established their mutual rights and obliga-
tions for a given time and that disputes about them are
merely questions of interpretation and adjudication,
that is, not proper subjects of economic warfare. This
prohibition on strikes may adversely affect workers if
conditions change during the life of the agreement.
Because of this, cost-of-living clauses have become
more common in negotiated agreements. But changes
due to technology, slow-downs in the economy (e.g.,
less overtime available, lay-offs, shortened work week,
etc.) are very difficult to argue about when the most ef-
44. United Steelworkers of America v. Radio Shack 80 C.L.L.C.
16,003 (C.A. Ont.) Another example is the recent Irwin Toys'
strike in Toronto, where the Steelworkers have, so far, been un-
successful in obtaining a contract which would give the largely
female workforce wage rates slightly above the statutory
minimum wage level.
45. The highlight decision is Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v. Golds-
tein (1963), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 449 (Ont. C.A.) in which, in effect,
all secondary boycotts were held to be illegal at common law.
46. For example, Quebec.
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ficient tool of persuasion - the strike - is not
available. Note again how much power to alter condi-
tions during the agreement is left to the employer. While
it is true that this power can be curtailed by effective
bargaining, remember how hamstrung unions are and
that whatever is not bargained for remains within the
realm of the employers' prerogative. In the final
analysis, if the employer decides to close down for
economic reasons there is nothing in the legislation or in
the collective agreement to stop it. The only worker-
equivalent of this is the individual worker's right to give
up her/his job during the collective agreement. The
scales are not evenly balanced. Once again, the rules
have been devised so that collective action has as little
impact as possible over and above that made by in-
dividual bargaining.
5. The collective bargaining legislation's apparent
desire to keep negotiated work conditions as close to
those as a true individualistic market would render is
further reflected in the selection of the appropriate
bargaining unit. As noted, workers are only allowed
concerted activity vis-a-vis their particular employer.
But, an employer's enterprise may have a variety of
kinds of employees working in different departments.
Should all employees be allowed to participate in collec-
tive bargaining? If so, should they be allowed to pool
their strength in one union? Such questions are left to be
determined by the labour relations' boards. Their rul-
ings will obviously have an effect on the bargaining
strength of the unit chosen. Over time the boards have
developed rules of thumb which they seem to apply as if
by rote to the many situations which they are asked to
handle. This gives the process a bureaucratic, neutral
Collective bargaining legislation is not
meant to give workers real power over
their income.
look. But the criteria developed by the boards manifest
a recognition that the employer's prerogative of man-
agement is paramount. For instance, a bargaining unit
should permit workers who have a community of in-
terest to coalesce. Community of interest is defined by
reference to such matters as the nature of the work per-
formed, the existing conditions of employment, the ad-
ministrative structure under which work is done, and
the physical arrangement in which work is done. All
these matters are within the control of the employer.
Moreover, other factors taken into account are whether
certification of a particular group will permit efficient
management and will be economically rational.
Boards do, however, have some regard for likely
union strength. It is recognized that, for the legislative
scheme to work, on-going trade unionism must be facil-
itated. Therefore, in defining the bargaining unit, the
board should have regard to this consideration while at
the same time, difficult though it be, "[A] structure is
needed which is conducive to voluntary settlements
without strikes and will minimize the disruptive effects
of the latter when they do occur." 47 Nothing could be
plainer: unions, yes, power, no, or, at least, as little as
possible. Note, as well, that boards, while wanting to
ensure that units do not get so large that they could
cause serious disruptions, do not want them so small
(merely to accommodate diverging views and "minor"
differences in job interests) that an employer will have
to deal with a multiplicity of unions. This
may result in an unnecessary fragmentation or atomizations
of the employees. Thus an employer faced with the
possibility of lengthy, protracted and expensive bargaining
and the further possibility of jurisdictional disputes among
multiple bargaining groups represented by one or more
trade unions may find it impossible to carry on a viable and
meaningful collective bargaining relationship... in those cir-
cumstances the Board will find the unit proposed inap-
propriate... 4
Given the very difficult task of balancing com-
peting interests (and according the boards which act in
good faith all the sympathy one can muster)
the bottom line, once again, is that lines drawn to curtail
collective bargaining are drawn where they are most
likely to ensure that employers, obliged to put up with
unionism, will be as little affected as possible.
6. If collective bargaining, even as constrained as it
is, can enhance workers' bargaining positions, then its
effect would be greater the more people participated in
it. But the legislative schemes systematically remove
huge numbers of workers from their scope. Typically,
but not universally, domestic servants and agricultural
workers are not permitted to collectively bargain. Public
servants are often excluded, as are police and fire
brigade employees. Frequently, such people are allowed
to form trade unions, but are denied the right to strike,
or, if they are permitted to use the strike weapon, the
matters about which they can bargain are severely
restricted. There are obviously a variety of justifications
for these exclusions. But note that they are varied and
not overly persuasive. Justifications used are the distinc-
tions between the essential and non-essential nature of
services and between private and public employers.
These distinctions are not so clear-cut as one might
think, especially the former. For instance, in Ontario,
orderlies, cooks, cleaners, etc., in hospitals funded by
47. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, and Canadian Union of
Public Employees, and Office and Technical Employees' Union,
and British Columbia Government Employees' Union, and Misc.
Workers', Wholesale and Retail Delivery Drivers' and Helpers'
Union, [19741 1 Can. L.R. B.R. 403, 407, (B.C.) per P.C. Weiler
(for the Board).
48. The Canadian Union of Public Employees, (applicant) and The
Board of Education for the City of Toronto (respondent) and
Group of Employees (objectors), [1970] O.L.R.B. Rep. 430,
435-36 (Ont.) per O.B. Shime.
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the provincial government may not strike, but garbage
collectors working for municipalities may. Is there not a
plausible argument to be made that a garbage collectors'
strike presents the greater danger to public health? The
spurious distinction between essential and non-essential
service gives rise to this difficulty. This is not the place
to analyse this issue in detail. What is to be noted is that
the exclusions are not self-explanatory. Indeed, the
scope of exclusion seems considerably larger than it has
to be if protection of the public at large is the common
denominator justifying the many exclusions. This can
be seen by the fact that the scope varies from jurisdic-
... if TIP is to be characterized as one
tool amongst many by which to contain
workers' demands, a labour lawyer like
me might contribute usefully by
cataloguing the various legal tools
governments have used, over time, to
negate workers' aspirations to obtain a
greater share of income.
tion to jurisdiction, without causing great variations in
the social fabric, public convenience or safety. If draw-
ing the line around permissible free collective bargaining
is a relatively arbitrary matter, the creation of exclu-
sions can be seen, in part, as an attempt to weaken the
overall economic power of the working class. In
Canada, where so many workers who are commonly
treated as mainstream members of the work force in
other industrialized countries are put outside the scope
of legitimate collective bargaining, this argument is very
persuasive.
7. In as much as collective bargaining is permitted,
it will inevitably lead to hardship. For instance, a legal
strike is likely to become most effective when the em-
ployer finds it difficult to meet its legal obligations, its
bills, or begins to lose sections of its market to com-
petitors. Often, however, the interruption to production
or service is such that other persons as well as the
employer feel the effects. In those circumstances, the
government sometimes will pass legislation, forcing the
strikers to go back to work. The argument is that the in-
nocent public should not have to pay the price of free
collective bargaining. Note the integration of this form
of argument with the 'one employer - one local union'
structure of collective bargaining.
While one can concede that there may be priorities
more important than the exercise of collective bargain-
ing rights, there are aspects of this ad hoc legislative
method of dealing with labour disputes which strongly
suggest the real purpose of collective bargaining, as
sanctified by legislation. Such legislative intervention
comes when the public is hurt. As there is no strike in
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which third persons will not be affected, the concern is
usually with those cases in which the employer renders
services to the public, on behalf of a level of govern-
ment, e.g., transport, medical, educational services. 4 9
In these kinds of cases, however, the only direct power
the right to strike gives is to hurt the consumers of the
services. They are the ones to whom the employer is ac-
countable, the employer in the illustrations used not
having an economic stake in the rendering of its ser-
vices but only a political responsibility to consumers.
That is, the right to strike is removed at precisely the
moment in time when it is likely to work. To underscore
this, the impasse, and thereby the hurt to the innocent
public, could be ended just as easily by legislatively forc-
ing the employer to resume the rendering of services by
offering the workers exactly what they are demanding.
After all, if the service is so essential, then the market
requires that the right price be paid. If this be thought a
little extreme, consider the issue this way. When strikers
are ordered back to work, they are usually ordered back
on the basis that they will work under the conditions
provided for by the lapsed collective agreement, which
they have legitimately refused to have continue. Alter-
natively, the back-to-work legislation may provide that
the last rejected offer by the employer be made the basis
of the renewed working relations. Workers are thus
compelled to accept conditions which the 'free' collec-
tive bargaining scheme gave them a right to reject, until
an arbitrator imposes new conditions. Why not have the
employer pay the rates demanded by workers which it,
in the proper exercise of its 'free' collective bargaining
rights refused to do, until an arbitrator imposes new
conditions?
The bias is clear. Collective bargaining is a right
which had to be given. But, it is given so that it will have
as little impact as possible. Where the impact is likely to
be great and it is politically easy to fabricate a reason for
doing so, the right will be taken away without cere-
mony. 0 The aim remains the same: to control the
workers' share of the pie.
8. The restriction of collective bargaining to the
'one employer - union local' context is a clear revela-
tion that 'free' collective bargaining is seen as being
about economic issues. Trade unions are, in part,
political organizations, yet their real power - the exer-
cise of collective pressure, the right to strike - cannot
effectively be used in the political sphere even though it
is recognized that conditions of work are largely govern-
ed by other factors than the state of a particular sector
of the market. The rate of currency exchange, the
monetary supply, government expenditures, protec-
tionist policies, etc., all play a role. If workers wish to
49. Although legislatures will not hesitate to interfere in other situa-
tions where private employers are involved and public safety and
health seem remote concerns. See Glasbeek, "Compulsory Ar-
bitration in Canada" in J. Loewenberg et al., An International
Comparison (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 45.
50. The Canadian Union of Postal Workers can attest to this.
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influence such policies can they use their right to com-
bine? The legal answer is that they may lobby, just like
any other interest group. They may not, however,
strike. They may not use the only real weapon they
have. Assume a system of wage controls is imposed by
the government, supported by the mass of employers.
The trade unions seek to destroy this policy, apparently
advantageous to their adversaries. They cannot strike,
because each group of employees will be illegally strik-
ing its particular employer. The famous Day of Protest
in respect of the AIB legislation illustrates this point."
This need not be belaboured. Collective bargaining
legislation is not meant to give workers real power over
their income. It is a permitted imperfection in the
idealized individualist market economic model, one
which has been forced on government by the working
class and has been negated as much as possible. The
proof is in the pudding. Jelly refers to the fact that
wages declined substantially as a proportion of national
income between 1970-1980.52 Given that this decade was
unusual, perhaps because of the AIB period, note that
the Report of Task Force on Labour Relations found
that between 1949-1967 the workers' share of the net
domestic product had remained remarkably constant."
In addition, note that economists have found it very dif-
ficult to make out a case that collective bargaining has
had any long range impact on change in the ratio be-
tween labour earnings and corporate profits. 5
4 Be that
as it may, if, on the whole, wage earners' share of in-
come is constant, then if collective bargainers have ob-
tained advantages it may only be at the expense of other
people, many of whom are purposely excluded from
'free' collective bargaining.
Taking the picture as a whole it seems unques-
tionable that public policy has had at least one constant
lode star, viz., containment of wage labour's demands
as much as the political context allowed. The introduc-
tion of any kind of incomes policy must therefore be
viewed as yet another instrument in this policy of con-
tainment, no matter how it is disguised.
Additional Dangers of an Incomes Policy
for Workers' Collectivism
Having painted a picture of a struggle in which
workers are in perpetual motion merely to stand still,
the question arises as to why a further instrument of
wage control should be attacked so vehemently. After
all, its additional effect on wage repressions would not,
in relative terms, be so great. Several points may be
made.
First, whatever the relative negative effect on wage
rates in the context of a variety of oppressive policies
and instruments, there will be an absolute negative ef-
fect.
Second, collective bargaining is integral to trade
unionism which is, in turn, the working class' response
to exploitation and oppression. Incomes policies under-
mine trade unionism. Once an incomes policy is in
place, there is very little to bargain about and, there-
fore, very little for a trade union to do. True, the union
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still has a role to play in organizing the permitted
package. True, it still has a function as an administrator
of the collective agreement. But what makes a trade
union a dynamic force, one which focusses the never-
ending struggle between investors and workers over the
share of the outcome of the enterprise and control of the
enterprise itself, is the possibility of harnessing the
workers' power. This only has meaning when the right
to strike, to act collectively in the most telling way of all,
can be invoked. Although theoretically this may still be
available under an incomes policy's regime, it is not an
easy matter to get workers to engage in a painful strike
when economic gains cannot be used as an enticement.
The notion that workers can be educated into striking
over safety and health issues (absent a cataclysmic
event) is fanciful."
51. It is no mere chance which made the unions use the term "Day of
Protest" rather than "General Strike." Employers immediately
saw how the law could be used to inhibit workers and many ac-
tions were threatened and some brought. The actions could,
theoretically, have been obtaining an order by a labour relations
board to cease and desist from conduct breaching the statute or a
collective agreement, obtaining the right to prosecute for such il-
legal conduct, bringing an action for damages arising out of the
breach of the collective agreement, bringing actions for con-
spiracy, inducing breaches of contract, etc., or submitting such a
matter to an arbitrator by way of a grievance for damages or
disciplining of employees for not abiding by the agreement. All
of these tactics were used. The Day of Protest is often described
as a failure by the union movement to motivate workers to pro-
test, as a sign of a lack of solidarity and class consciousness.
Given the legal framework of "free' collective bargaining, the
fact that many workers did not work on the Day of Protest is
remarkable. Note that labour relations boards were more sen-
sitive to the fact that the use of the law might alert workers to
their lack of power and they sought to avoid the difficulties
created by the general strike. In British Columbia the Board
argued that, as there was no labour dispute as defined by the
Code, it had no jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. But this left
the workers at the mercy of the common law remedies of which
there were many. See British Columbia Hydro and Power Au-
thority, [197612 Can. L.R.B.. 410 and text at supra notes 40, 41.
52. Supra note 1.
53. Canadian Industrial Relations, The Report of Task Force on
Labour Relations (P.C. Office, Dec. 1968), para. 207. 1949
marks the de facto commencement of our modern collective
bargaining practices.
54 Lewis, Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States (1963).
found a 10 to 15 per cent relative gain attributable to unioniza-
tion. But others are not so sanguine. Gunderson found there to
be conflicting evidence as to whether there was any gain at all,
see Labour Market Economies (Toronto: McCraw-Hill Ryerson,
1980), p. 317; so also did Chamberlain, Labor (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill, 1958); Peitchinis, The Economics of Labour
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1965), found some positive effect, but
not much.
55. The argument made is more persuasive if the incomes policy is a
permanent one, rather than a temporary one such as AIB was.
Note here that the Crowley paper, supra note 15 concentrated on
the effects of a temporary incomes policy on collective bargain-
ing. Further, the reasoning that collective bargaining was not af-
fected seriously depended on the notion that, if collective
bargaining continued between particular participants as before,
no adverse effect had occurred. This ignores the workers' need to
have larger and more trade unions and more militant trade
unions.
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In addition, the union, having been robbed of its
raison d'etre - orchestrating workers' activities around
increasing pay packets - is tempted to take up a role as
bureaucratic administrator. This tendency will be en-
hanced by a new feeling of empathy with the employer.
As the wage package (contrast its structure) is not in
issue, it is likely that a much greater ambience of col-
laboration will ensue than otherwise would exist. Thus,
Reid reports that during the AIB period, 70 per cent of
wage increases submitted to the AIB were at or below the
arithmetic legislative guidelines.56 What were trade
unions doing? The presumption must be that they were,
reluctantly perhaps, doing a lot of agreeing with
management. To justify their existence, trade unions
are, if the incomes restraints last for any length of time,
likely to emphasize their roles as managers of discon-
tent." For those who see in militant trade unionism the
only bulwark against worker oppression, this is a dan-
gerous development.
Third, it is extremely difficult for trade unions to
expand membership when they cannot offer the promise
of economic improvement. In as much as expanding the
coverage of collective bargaining would help the general
workers' cause, yet another blow is struck by the imposi-
tion of an incomes policy.
Fourth, incomes policies act as Trojan horses. The
dangers to workers and trade unions are so great that,
when they are imposed, a great deal of energy and
organization is put into having them removed. This
precious waste of resource is a real loss. Worse,
however, is the fact that trade unions and workers are
forced to fight for the toehold on survival they have,
viz., the very limited form of collective bargaining they
have been given. Unsurprisingly, therefore, they come
to think of this as something truly valuable. They come
to be fooled into thinking it is "free" collective bargain-
ing, rather than to recognize it to be a carefully adapted
scheme of restraint. It is in this framework that forces
which, on the face of it, ought to welcome a rational
economic planning instrument are moved to oppose it,
to argue for a retention of existing bastardized market
precepts. I8
Summary
1. The present inflation rate, by itself, does not
warrant the imposition of an incomes policy.
2. Stagflation may justify such a policy. If it comes
as part of a monetarist policy, it is likely only to soften
the worst aspects of inevitable hardship. Its effect on
dampening inflation rate expectations is, at best, uncer-
tain. If it is offered as an integral part of an industrial
strategy plus welfare net package, it is likely to be the
only part of the package implemented pro tanto and,
therefore, likely to cause workers to sacrifice im-
mediately, other sectors maybe never.
3. Whatever the reasons given for imposing in-
comes policies, there is abundant evidence to indicate
that they act primarily as instruments of worker
restraint for the benefit of the employer class. Further,
there is persuasive evidence that, whatever the reasons
given for the imposition of incomes policies, they are
part of a general policy to restrain workers' earnings for
the benefit of the employer class.
4. To disregard the political thrust behind policy
instruments such as collective bargaining and incomes
policies is to study economics in a vacuum. Only profes-
sional economists can afford that. Workers cannot.
56. Reid, "Wage-and-Price Controls in Canada," in Anderson and
Gunderson, eds., Union-Management Relations in Canada
(Toronto: Addison-Wesley, 1982), pp. 482, 495.
57 That is, to help the employer administer the agreement and to
concentrate on workers' individual grievances. Although often
this latter is seen as a challenge to management, it is a form of
shared control over the workers' environment which, in the end,
may suit the employer admirably. For a seminal argument to this
effect, see R. Edwards, Contested Terrain (New York: Basic
books, 1979).
58. Thus Weiler argues that trade unions have been in the vanguard
of the movement to regulate society, to put ceilings on rents, to
protect consumers and the environment. Therefore, he says, "lilt
ill behooves them to declaim that the world of free collective
bargaining is sacrosanct." See P. Weiler, Reconcilable Dif-
ferences (Agincourt, Ont.: Carswell, 1980), p. 254. This misses
the point that collective bargaining is not free and that, to a
regulatee under the scheme, there is about as much regulation as
can be tolerated. There is, indeed, a better argument as to why
trade unions should support incomes policies. Such policies
demonstrate that the restriction on workers' earning power is not
solely due to an unchallengeable abstraction, the market, but
that the supposedly neutral State is willing to interfere at the
behest of the capitalist class. See Clark, "Introduction: The
Raison D'Etre of Trade Unionism," in Clark & Clements, (eds.)
Trade Unions under Capitalism (London: Fontana-Collins, 1977)
pp. 19-20. But this is an idealized political argument, one which
one does not have the right to ask workers to support by sacrific-
ing themselves now. Only those who pretend to support trade
unions, but who really believe in their containment, would make
righteous comments about the presumptuousness of workers
who object to this particular form of regulation.
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